are in the midst of a somewhat unique shift. Similar to
past turning points, excesses during the run-up are
causing a traditional investor pullback as risk is repriced.
During the first quarter of 2008, however, a full-blown credit
crunch emerged, with much different characteristics than in
past cycles, due to the very nature of the financial engineering
that fueled the boom. The pooling of a broad range of
home loans, including high-risk subprime mortgages, into
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) made it easy and temporarily
profitable for lenders to increase originations and
relax underwriting standards. Home sales soared well above
real demand drivers, leading to overbuilding and significant
speculation. Poor risk assessment by ratings agencies and
investors in these pools resulted in an underestimation of
potential defaults, particularly for adjustable-rate subprime
loans that reset at dramatically higher interest rates. The wide
use of related complex financial instruments and derivatives
tied to MBS further exacerbated the risk and has made it difficult
to quantify and reprice the now-troubled portions of
these investments. The resulting liquidity crunch emerged as
uncertainty regarding the magnitude and true “market”
value of these securities pushed investors to the sidelines and
led banks to tighten lending standards across the board.